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on

THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES
IN A CHANGING WORLD ENVIRONMENT

INTRODUCTION

by

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I know then you're authorized to have more dance than that--especially today--you painted it.

our attendance. It's one of the biggest attendance we've had. I was here when Burke he brought in a lot of sound obliterated--mechanical difficulty--multiple voices-- graduated in '46; a couple of years as a Rhodes Scholar, where he proceeded to get a Master's Degree in Political Science. Then he was in Destroyers. And I've got a little copy in here, "He is a fine Destroyerman, which in this area is an accolade of greats. stands around if it gets too hard, that's the time for the Destroyerman to take over."

He was on CINCPAC's staff. He was at the Nuclear Test at Christmas Island. He was assigned to the Systems Analysis, where he worked in Navy Force Levels. He was in Tonkin Gulf, with the Destroyer HORNE (by the way named after my old pal, Horne). Then he served as Executive Assistant; then Naval Aide to the Secretary of the Navy.

He did so damned well in all this that he became a Rear Admiral in 1970. Then he was sent to the SIXTH Fleet, where he had his flag on which cruiser? (Answer:) USS INDEPENDENCE. Ah! (Laughter) and then in April 1971 he became Director of the Systems Analysis Division.

This year he made full of
the old zing! I give you our speaker for the
evening, Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, who is going to
discuss the Navy's new policies and planning guidance systems.
I doubt very much, though, that he'll hang on this too long.

Mr. President, Admirals, Governors. Thank you for that detailed introduction, Admiral Bates. I think I will say, that in regards to the rumors of change at the Naval War College, I feel like Mark Twain. You remember his saying, "The rumors of my death have been grossly exaggerated."

I'm always a little worried when someone in the Introduction mentions that I worked in Systems Analysis. Because it with many people is a dirty word and I must confess I worked for them. But I thought I'd tell you a story of how they did Systems Analysis, because I think it's very revealing of that area of the Pentagon.

One night Mr. McNamara, after a long, hard day, went to his home in Washington. His teenage son was there, and they were having dinner. The boy said, "Dad, what did you do today to help the Defense Department?" And McNamara said, "I'm glad you asked that, because I saved 3 billion dollars today for the government." He said, "The Army wanted to do this job; the Navy wanted to do this job, and the Navy could do it for 3 billion dollars less, and it was just about as effective; so I gave it to the Navy and saved that 3 billion dollars. Son, I want you to understand that you always look for an alternative. See if they're about equal in capability, and then you pick the cheaper one and you save a lot of money."

Well (the boy) thought about this and he went to bed that night and the next evening when McNamara came to dinner, the boy was just beaming from ear to ear. "Dad, I remembered your

lesson to look for two alternative ways to do the same thing, equally to take the cheap one and save the money. I went down and I was standing on the corner for the school bus this morning; and I had my quarter in my hand. I said, "There must be two ways to get to school; and I ran to school all the way behind that school bus, and I saved 25 cents. Now isn't that what you were trying to teach me?"

McNamara said, "That's just great. You really are catching on; but son, tomorrow when you get down to the corner with your quarter, and you're standing on the corner waiting for the bus, run to school behind a taxicab and you'll save \$2.50!"

I'm very grateful after 18 days in office in the Naval War College. I am privileged to be here at this prestigious Quindicim Club. I am also enchanted and just thrilled to be at the Naval War College whether we make changes or we don't make changes. I think it's an exciting time at the Naval War College. The Navy is still undergoing changes; the entire military establishment is. The entire country is in a period of questioning what they want to do and how they want to use military force. And I think it opens an opportunity for us in the educational end of the Navy, to encourage our officers to develop patterns of flexible thinking so they can respond to these changing conditions and environments. And it places upon us a responsibility and a challenge. And I'm going to very much. And I think that in this time we want to emphasize in the education here the

development of habits of thinking; the development of ability to look at all sides of an issue, to be able to understand it; the ability to see the other fellow's point of view, so that when you are starting in to think with him, you can understand his point, and hopefully, make yours to him.

I think these are the main challenges and things that will emphasize the academic aspect of our endeavors at the Naval War College.

I haven't really been here long enough to (pause when interrupted by music and a comment from listeners) I haven't been here really long enough to set the course I feel is best for the Naval War College. But I have thought about it enough, and studied about it enough to have two guiding principles that I would like to mention.

The first, I think, one of the activities that made this Naval War College great for the Navy is epitomized by the quotation from Admiral Nimitz, in which he says to the effect that "the tactics in World War II were all except the Kamikaze attacks, gamed here at the Naval War College; and this made a tremendous contribution to our readiness for that war."

And I do believe that in his day a great deal of pre-occupation in military circles, where all of the interaction of military with the political and international factors, that we in the Navy must have faith in what Admiral Nimitz said about the value of the War College, and its increasing

attendance to our knowledge of our own professionalism, to our own skills as Naval Officers, and develop that flexibility of thinking in regard to our tactics.

The world of technology is changing rapidly; and we have to develop officers here who know the profession of the Navy; that they know it isn't just "Right Standard Rudder" when Condition A exists; Left Standard Rudder when Condition B exists; that they understand how to be flexible and why it's Right and why it's Left, when it is. I think this will make them more adaptable to the difficult, challenging and changing times that lie ahead.

The second principle I think we should look to more as we proceed in the War College is the example of the man whose name, of course, epitomizes the War College, Alfred Thayer Mahan. When we look at his tremendous contribution, it seems to me that from his personal, individual, hard study and research here in Newport, and his putting that into words and writing, which has for decades now influenced statesmen, military men and leaders all over the world.

And therefore, I think that Mahan did not take a 30 day course and look at a great many things in telling it; he looked in depth into a few things and did them very well. And we want, in the years ahead, to emphasize this as a principle of the War College, and, as I said earlier, bring much more than academic truly research and individual effort to the College.

But I figured, not to tell you about the War College, because I'm too new to speak with authority on it, but I thought I would like tonight, in line with this kind of general philosophy, to share with you my general thoughts as to which way the Navy is going in order to fit into the requirements of the country in the decade ahead.

Now I would like, Mr. President, if I may, to feel that I can shoot "straight from the hip" here. I have not been able to clear the remarks I'm intending to make with the authorities with the Defense Department, who censor us. I don't know that they would be cleared if I submitted them. And I'm hoping that tonight I can talk to all of you "off the record" and we'll get to know each other most in the Question Period in a forthright way and later (voice of person interrupting blots out Admiral Turner's words here). but as I say, the thing that I would like to work on very briefly, is how we're going to adapt the military and in particular, of course, the Navy to what seems to me to be three important changes in the world of environment.

One of those changes is the erosion of the bipolar world that we've known for the last 25 years--Russia and the United States, and it seems to me we're evolving towards a 5-sided world, though I must say I hate to bring up this thing about pentagonal arrangements after I've just escaped from one.

But Japan, with the addition of nuclear weapons, will be a major power in short order. China, with the growth in her

economy, can have all the attributes of a major power. A United Western Europe, once they gain some cohesiveness of direction and economy, is undoubtedly in the Major League.

What does this do to us? I think this bodes for the future, reduced freedom of maneuver for the individual major powers. And I would think that in the future we're going to be concerned with not being on the short side of a 1 out of 5, or a 2 out of 5 position; and that alignments around the world are not going to be the permanent alliance type of arrangement, but they're going to be "ad hoc;" on this issue, these three against those two, on that issue, these four against this one. And in each case we're going to be looking and maneuvering to be sure that we don't end up on the short side of the stick more often than we have to, and adapting our policies accordingly.

I think the second major change in the world environment is the change in domestic attitudes; the change in national objectives, which I don't believe have settled down yet. But it's clear that the country is today less willing to sustain the cost of large military forces than it's been in the past. There's more competition for the dollar. Defense budget used to be 52% of the national budget. It's now down to 30%. And the other in this year, for the first time the Health, Education and Welfare budget is larger than the Defense Budget. And the Health Education and Welfare and other areas like that of the Budget are today growing faster than the Gross National

Product. Now that means , that more money has to be raised by taxes or that this has got to come from some of the other sections--and that's Defense.

So there's going to be a continual crush on the dollar; and we in the military are bracing and trying to see how we can adapt to this. But I think this same attitude is reflected in a lesser willingness of people of the country to be ready to intervene in any kind of an overseas military adventure. They're less willing to shoulder the same kinds of responsibility that we assumed as a nation for the past quarter of a century.

And I think we may see the time when the country may be less willing even to maintain military forces overseas as we have for these 25 years.

The third trend or change of environment that I would comment on is the changing--or in some respects, the unchanging threat. I think it's unchanging in magnitude. I see no slackening in the Soviet resolve and intent and dedication to continue building a military force that will match and outdo ours. On the other hand I do see a change in its nature. I see a greater maritime thrust to the Soviet intent and purpose in recent years. I think that they realize as fully as we do that land wars in Europe today would be almost unthinkable; a risk that neither one of us could afford; and that probably today there is less danger of a major conflagration on the land in Europe than there has been since the early 1950's.

Recognizing this, it appears to me that the Soviets are intent on leap frogging that stalemated frontier, and they're doing it in Europe by their pressure on the flanks of NATO. They're trying to make _____ and the Eastern Mediterranean Soviet lakes, where they can give those countries the certain impression that they control their fate, they can cut them off from access to the world. Then we see them leap frog into Egypt and establishing bases. We see them trying to control the entrances to the Red Sea, and Yemen and Somalia. We see them moving into Mauritius. We see them maintaining their contact, at least until recent weeks North Vietnam, through their ability to move across the seas, both with their Merchant Marine and with their Naval power.

But what do these three major changes of the _____ world, change in domestic attitudes and ambition; and the change in nature of the concept mean to us in terms of how we in the military look upon our contribution to the country?

I'd like, very briefly, to look at three of the major geographical areas that we're going--that we have been--traditionally concerned with, and see how these changes

I think it's clear that our perspective in the European Theater in the next decade, must be to keep a United Western Europe from becoming too closely allied from making too many of the ad hoc alliances with the Soviet Union as opposed to us.

And therefore, our military effort in Europe should be keyed to cementing our ties with a United Western Europe.

How can we do that? I think we're only a small part of the game in the military. But we should consider our policies and our strategy with regard to what will bring the Western Europeans into confidence of staying allied closely with us?

Obviously, I think the best and strongest thing we can do is to continue to maintain our forces on the ground in Europe. They are the greatest , pure earnest of our intent, to help.

But there are two things about that. They're only a token of what would be needed in the event of the improbable war in Europe. They're only a token of the ; and we must be able to reinforce and resupply those forces if they're going to be meaningful in the eyes of the Europeans.

Secondly, either because of domestic pressures or agreements with the Soviets, we may well reduce those forces, whether we want to or not, as a matter of policy. And therefore, as we reduce, if we do, reinforcements by sea become even more vital to our strategy and to in our European Allies.

This would leave us with several questions. What can we do to reassure our European allies of our ability to reinforce and resupply them in any event? I do not have an easy answer to that. Tom Weschler, of the Cruiser-Destroyer Force here, is one of the men most responsible for this ability

to maintain the North Atlantic lifeline. I would say that the stress is on the ascendancy, that the pendulum of the offensive submarine is ahead of the swing back to the defense. This always happens in warfare; and that it's a very difficult thing at this point to predict, what and how the Navy can build a greater assurance of being able to maintain that lifeline. We should work hard at it, we must work hard at it, it will take all our imagination, all our efforts and a good bit of resources. But where would they come from? In a declining budget, I think it leaves us with the dilemma, of would we, should we, reduce ground forces, and landbased air forces and count more heavily on reserves to augment them quickly, but be sure by building up our NATO sea control forces, that we can get them across when we have them ready; and that we can get them across in the early days of the conflict. Because that's the real problem.

And I don't know that that is the answer I don't know whether we should emphasize the sea control element of our NATO strategy more than we should large forces in being to fight in Europe if necessary. And I would suggest that the decision on what balance we should put, would rest on our appraisal of which strategy would best reassure the Europeans that we will and can come to their aid if necessary, and encourage them to stay in our camp, on our side of the 5 to 1, 4 to 1, 3 to 2 alliances.

Let me look briefly at Asia. Here I think, of the 3 changes in the world environment that I think of--the change in domestic attitude is the one that most affects our attitude and our policy in Asia. And I think that is the unwillingness, the undesirability of getting involved in any kind of a major land confrontation in particularly in the Asian Theater.

And this means that the constitution of our military contingent in Asia should be committed to deterrence. We don't want to fight there. The countries may not even let us keep deterrent forces on Asian soil again for many years; so we want to use the military as best we can to deter conflict in that theater.

Asia sees four of the five major world powers very much on the scene: China, Russia, Japan and then ourselves. If in that 4-power arrangement, we can always maintain good relations with Japan, and if at the same time we assume--which I think is a reasonable assumption--that China and Russia are not likely to come together on many issues in the near term, we're always going to be on the best of the 3 to 1 side in Asia. So I think our policy in Asia has improved. It may prove the best policy we've had for many years now, complementary to the same policies in the Atlantic, with a United Western Europe.

But once again, on United States military it helps the diplomat; it helps the economist and the others to maintain that kind of a relationship with Japan. I think perhaps in many ways even less than in Europe, but again, I

think you see our policies, you see our attitudes towards giving what contribution we can.

And I think that there are two basic things we can do; one is to continue to offer a nuclear shield to the Japanese. We do that with our landbased bombers in the Philippines--Guam--no longer in Okinawa. We do it with our carrier bombers; on largely with our submarines in the Pacific.

The second thing, it seems to me, relates to Japan's . As you know, communications with Japan even it is rated an island nation, is one without and domestic resources they usually have.

And therefore, I would suggest that if it is agreed that we can afford to maintain effective sea-control forces in the Asian Theater, we can help to reassure the Japanese that they are not at the mercy of the strong Soviet Fleet in that area of the world.

Third and last I would refer, not to a specific geographical area, but what has been known over the years as Indian Africa, but we might not, of course, want to get involved in any of them.

But here again, is that same domestic attitude of reluctance to get involved with, I think, the way we looked at, in case our military forces were a possible threat in their wars.

If we are going to resolve the problem by attempting to withdraw some of our forces stationed overseas, it makes it even more difficult to maintain the presence of that force,

And therefore, I am enthusiastic about what Admiral Zumwalt terms the "relevant powers" of two powers in this kind of a situation: relevant in the sense that the mobile air and amphibious forces of the Navy are those that the President must be able to employ in the event of a brush fire confrontation in which the country wanted to play some role, attempting to deter it from growing or perhaps even, from breaking up.

(Remark by Admiral Turner inaudible)

I had the privilege of participating in such an event just about two years ago, when we had the Jordanian Crisis. The Jordanian planes came down, and I was in INDEPENDENCE in the Eastern Mediterranean. We rallied the Senators

and before it was over by increasing by 50 percent our carrier force in the Eastern Mediterranean. We signaled Mr. Nixon's interest in that situation. Whether that was at all determinant in the fact that the situation down, we can't say.

Then, we did signal intent to watch that situation carefully, and we did so, and we had "relevant power" on the scene.

And in the future, as the national resolve to participate in these kinds of things, perhaps grows less, the country would do very well, I would suggest, in a situation like that, to deploy into the country--to deploy landbased air forces into the country, because the commitment is very great. Moving naval air and amphibious forces into offshore positions would our flexibility of ambiguity where we can signal if we want

public. We can withdraw. We haven't crossed any borders, or put any soldiers ashore.

Now I wouldn't want to leave the impression that I think that's the answer to all of our military requirements in this country. Because naval air and amphibious forces are only a small--relatively speaking--token power. And if the country is likely to want to get further involved, if we make those decisions to participate, or to actively engage in such

wars, we can try it first with Naval air power, without putting anybody ashore.

If that doesn't succeed, we can put the Marines in, and we always will have the option of bringing them back out over the beach, if the decision is made to cut our lines.

But the capability of those troops is limited to small campaigns. If we agree we're going to get involved, we would have to then be ready to bring up air mobile, Army and Air Force landbased Air using and coming into airfields that the Marines and the Navy had secured in these areas.

We need this combination of forces in our bag in this country, in order to have this credible, relevant power that I'm talking about. Of course, forces are a deterrent in this type of a situation, only because it is important that they are backed up by rapidly mobilizable, rapidly deployable, larger forces that can take on and expand, if that is the requirement of the situation.

I would conclude by saying that as these situations change, our military budget may continue to (cough obliterates word), the whole environment in which were working, as we move into this decade of the Seventies, I think it would be coincidental if the same balance between landbased air forces, ground forces, and seabased forces that served the country so well for the last several decades, were in fact, the one that suited it best for the next decade.

And I think that it is proper and important that we at this time in view of some of the dramatic changes in the world environment, re-evaluate what balance we want, and which balance correctly suits the country's needs.

And I would say that whether the answer is likely to come out as I would like--a maritime strategy--and as I sincerely believe, would best suit the country--I do not know, but I do sincerely believe, that the question must be asked, and the country must think about it, and the people of your stature and capability must give it thought in order to insure

that we get the best mix of military forces in the decade ahead for our national security!

Thank you very much.

End of Lecture.